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ABSTRACT
We comment on a paper published in the same issue of the London Journal of Primary Care. 
We applaud Bow’s engagement with the ethical issues in a previous LJPC paper but argue 
that further work is needed to establish the everyday moral concerns of health care workers in 
primary care. We also suggest that the ethical distinction between advice and medication and 
devices may be artificial if both have an effect on a patient.
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We are delighted to see a response to an LJPC article [1] 
by Stephen Bow [2] that engages with the arguments 
presented. We encourage articulate responses to all LJPC 
papers. Some of the arguments used by Bow to contest 
the paper are themselves contestable, and we will briefly 
raise them here to inform future debate and future lines 
of research.
There is a discussion to be had about whether sexual 
health workers who object to the use of various forms of 
contraception in and of themselves should have a right 
of conscientious objection. The point has controversially 
been raised for doctors by Savulescu.[3] Further empir-
ical work is needed to determine how much of an issue 
this is, for what proportion of clinicians who give sex-
ual health advice and contraception, and how this may 
become problematic for those clinicians.
There is some philosophical debate over whether preg-
nancy can be considered to be harmful. Bow is quite right 
to suggest that many of the arguments that lead this way 
are consequentialist or utilitarian – arguments range from 
a threat to the mother’s physical health, through to a soci-
etal concern with prevention of births into adverse circum-
stances. As Bow rightly suggests, societal interests may well 
be at issue rather than those of the sexually active child.
We think that the distinction between advice and 
treatment as ‘words’ and a ‘treatment or device’ is 
 possibly artificial. The prescription of condoms might 
well deter inappropriate sexual activity. Conversely, 
advice on methods of contraception is arguable contra-
ceptive if it leads to behaviours that prevent conception. 
A more defensible ethical distinction might be between 
treatment that prevents conception and treatment that 
prevents implantation or induces miscarriage – but this 
is not the discussion at hand in either Papanikitas or Bow 
papers.
We welcome correspondence regarding the above 
papers via the LJPC forum.
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• Further work is needed to establish the everyday moral concerns of health care workers in primary care.
• The ethical distinction between advice and medication and devices may be artificial if both have an effect on a 
patient.
